The DMCA Subpoena Power: Who does it Actually Protect?
by
Thomas P. Ludwig*
I.

INTRODUCTION

After years of legal maneuvering and courtroom skirmishes, the lines in the war between
copyright holders and online copyright infringers have been clearly drawn. This conflict, which
is poised to erupt in courts across the country, began decades ago with the birth of the Internet,
which gave rise to a previously unparalleled opportunity for the dissemination, sharing, and
enjoyment of every conceivable form of human expression. In addition to the benefits it has
provided, the Internet also has given rise to copyright infringement on a global scale through the
unauthorized posting and sharing of digital files. After years of unsuccessfully battling Internet
service providers (ISPs) and file sharing network software distributors, such as Napster and
KaZaA, the war against digital copyright infringement may end soon, now that copyright holders
are finally taking action directly against the actual infringers. To bring such actions against
individual infringers, copyright holders must serve subpoenas on the ISPs pursuant to the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act1 [hereinafter DMCA] to obtain the infringers’ subscriber information.
Before the real conflict concerning copyright infringement can be fought in the courts or over
settlement tables, various issues with the intermediate subpoena process must be resolved. First,
does the subpoena authority granted by the DMCA put too much power into the hands of
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copyright owners? And even more importantly, does this subpoena power strip from alleged
infringers any defense that they may have against its abuse? Unless an appropriate balance can
be reached with respect to the authority granted by the DMCA’s subpoena provision, the war
against copyright infringement will be won at the expense of service providers and the
Constitutional rights of alleged infringers.
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the DMCA subpoena provision neither aids
those attempting to enforce copyrights nor sufficiently protects the interests of Internet users. A
recent decision by the DC Court of Appeals stripped copyright holders of the use of the DMCA
subpoena in situations where the offender’s ISP acts merely as a conduit for the transmission of
infringing material, which encompasses the most pervasive and egregious form of infringement:
unauthorized sharing of copyrighted material via peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, such as KaZaA.2
Thus, the DMCA subpoena power is unavailable to copyright holders when it is most needed.
This situation must be remedied.
At the same time, and even more importantly, additional statutory safeguards protecting
the interests of ISPs and the rights of alleged copyright infringers must be built into the subpoena
provision, which may be accomplished without sacrificing or significantly impeding copyright
owners’ ability to enforce their copyrights. At best, the DMCA subpoena provision, in its
current form, completely undermines alleged infringers’ Fifth Amendment due process rights
and unfairly places the likely immense burden of challenging and responding to subpoenas on
ISPs. At worst, the provision is susceptible to mistakes and abuse by those who would use it for
purposes other than copyright enforcement. The inclusion of certain requirements, such as
requiring the provision of notice to alleged infringers before their subscriber information is
2
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released, would not unduly burden copyright holders or hinder the enforcement process, but
would protect against mistakes and abuse.
Part II of this Article will briefly paint a picture of the events leading up to the copyright
holders’ utilization of the DMCA subpoena power. Next, Part III will give an overview of the
DMCA, focusing primarily on the subpoena provision and Congress’s intent regarding that
subsection. Part IV will then discuss the specific practical and Constitutional problems that have
been raised with respect to the DMCA subpoena power and how the courts have addressed them.
Finally, Part V will propose various solutions to the more serious problems and conclude that
their implementation would provide a more balanced approach to copyright enforcement.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Rise of Digital Copyright Infringement
The birth of the Internet granted artists, musicians, and writers the opportunity for global

exposure never before achieved through traditional media, such as radio, television, live, books,
or compact discs.

Ironically, consumers began utilizing the potential for the widespread

distribution of copyrighted material via the Internet long before copyright holders or their agents
started to take advantage of the possibility.3 During the 1990’s, Internet users began to make
copyrighted material publicly available, both legally and illegally, on Web and FTP sites.4 As
technology has since rapidly developed, it has become increasingly simple to reproduce, store,
and disseminate copyrighted material as digital files.5

For example, the processing speed,
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Robert MacMillan, Internet Sparks a Copyright Fire, Washingtonpost.com (June 24, 2003), at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A234812003Jun23&notFound=true (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
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File Transfer Protocol (FTP) allows the efficient transfer of large files from one remote location to another.
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MacMillan, supra note 3.
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storage capacity, and overall performance of personal computers have grown exponentially
during the last twenty years, allowing copyrighted materials to be stored and played in ever
increasing levels of quantity and quality.6 The ability to compress enormous media files while
retaining the quality of the original has made the transfer and storage of large amounts of
copyrighted material, such as songs and movies, progressively more efficient.7 Today, even the
most inexperienced computer user can engage in copyrighted file sharing with the recent
development of P2P networks, which allow users to locate and transfer files directly amongst
themselves without the need for intermediate, centralized hubs or servers.8
The development of P2P networks and similar file sharing technology has probably had
the most significant effect on digital copyright infringement. Currently, there are more than 57
million American users of file sharing technology who, together with millions of other users
around the world, are downloading billions of music files every year.9 At any given time,
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Raj Sardesai & Michael J. Ram, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in Software: The Software Patent, 11
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 99 (1999).
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Michael Yang & Francis J. Gorman, What’s Yours is Mine, 36 MD. B. J. 24, 31 (2003) (“The most popular and
well-known format for music compression is known as MP3. The MP3 compression format permits a CD-quality
digital music file to be compressed to roughly one-tenth the original size without noticeably affecting the sound
quality. With this degree of file compression, the MP3 format allows users to save significant space on their
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existed, digital music files could not easily be transferred due to their size and the relatively slow speed of most
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Id. at 31-32. See also GES Systems, Inc., Networking (“In Peer-to-Peer networks, the connected computers have
no centralized authority. From an authority viewpoint all computers are equal. In other words they are peers.”), at
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MacMillan, supra note 3 (citing a study that estimated that more than 5 billion music files were downloaded from
P2P networks in 2002). In its recent motion to enforce a subpoena issued to Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
however, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) claimed that “[m]ore than 2.6 billion infringing
music files are downloaded monthly.” Motion to Enforce Subpoena Issued to the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology at 2, In re Subpoena to the Mass. Inst. of Tech., No. 1:03-MS-00265 (filed Aug. 1, 2003) (citing L.
Grossman, It’s All Free, Time, May 5, 2003, at 60-69) [hereinafter Motion to Enforce Subpoena to MIT].

4

roughly 700 to 900 million files are available on the infamous KaZaA network alone.10 Studies
show that approximately 90% of the content shared on P2P networks is copyrighted material
disseminated without authorization.11 Based on this 90% infringement rate, there are between
630 and 810 million infringing files available just on KaZaA at any particular moment. KaZaA,
however, is not the only P2P network that is being used to share copyright infringing files.12
The explosive growth in computer and data transfer technology, especially the
development of P2P networks, has fueled the rampant unauthorized dissemination of copyrighted
material online.13 Naturally, this infringement has had a dramatic impact on the profits of many
copyright owners, most notably those in the music recording industry.

Recent statistics

demonstrate the considerable extent of this impact. P2P networks began to take hold late in
1999, and compact disc sales fell immediately, declining 7% in 2000, 10% in 2001, and 11% in
2002.14 This annual decline in CD sales over the last three years represents more than $1 billion
in lost annual revenues.15 Clearly, the unauthorized sharing of music files on P2P networks is
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A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001).
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While KaZaA is the most downloaded program on the Internet (over 230 million copies have been downloaded),
there are other highly popular P2P network programs in existence, as well. Napster was probably the best known of
all the P2P networks, but the RIAA was able to force it to shut down in 2001. Today, Grokster, Morpheus, Lime
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Motion to Enforce Subpoena to MIT at 3 (citing the RIAA’s website at
http://www.riaa.com/pdf/2002yrendshipments.pdf).
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David McGuire, Online Piracy Frightens Movie Moguls, Washingtonpost.com (June 24, 2003) (noting that
revenues from CD sales dropped from $13.2 billion in 2000 to $12 billion in 2002), at
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having a substantial effect on the music industry’s revenues, and the problem is only getting
more serious.16
The music industry, however, is not the only market sector feeling the squeeze that
widespread copyright infringement is putting on profits. A recent study found that 8 percent of
American Internet users illegally downloaded at least one movie during a three-month period in
2002, which is not insignificant considering the number of Internet users in the United States.17
And while the motion picture industry’s estimate of 400,000 illegal movie downloads per day
may seem relatively small compared to the many millions of infringing music files downloaded
daily, rapid technological development could cause that number to skyrocket within a few
years.18 The software industry is also facing similar issues regarding copyright infringement.19
B.

Copyright Owners Fight Back
Of course, the music industry and other copyright owners have not given up these lost

revenues without a fight, both on the technological and legal fronts. Copyright owners have
attempted to protect their interests with new security tools, such as encryption and other copyprotection measures. This strategy has had only limited success, however, due to the rapidly

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A235752003Jun23&notFound=true (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
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to get one grainy, cheaply recorded copy of the latest Hollywood release.” Id. Increases in bandwidth and digital
technology, however, could put the movie industry in the same position as the music industry within 3-5 years. Id.
19

MacMillan, supra note 3.

6

evolving nature of technology.20 Developing new copyright protection systems is an expensive
process and technologically sophisticated users are commonly able to circumvent such
measures.21 To make matters worse, the methods of circumvention are generally shared over the
Internet with less savvy users.22
Copyright owners have not had much more success on the legal front, or at least not until
now. Their difficulty up to this point has been finding a party to hold responsible for the
unbounded copyright infringement that is taking place. Copyright owners have been extremely
wary of directly pursuing individual infringers for fear of creating bad publicity and alienating
consumers.23 ISPs have not been effective targets because Title II of the DMCA, which is the
focus of this Article, limits the liability of unwitting service providers in cases involving their
subscribers’ digital copyright infringement.24 In addition, service providers have little control
over their subscribers’ unauthorized downloading of copyrighted material.
While the creators and distributors of P2P network software would appear to be
appropriate defendants in actions for contributory or vicarious infringement, the courts’ holdings
have fallen on both sides of this issue.25 Although copyright holders will likely continue to fight
20

Martin F. Halstead, The Regulated Become the Regulators: Problems and Pitfalls in the New World of Digital
Copyright Legislation, 38 TULSA L. REV. 195, 224 (2002) (noting that current copyright protection systems are not
effective).
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Id.
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Id. In addition, copyright protection systems are extremely controversial and unpopular because they prevent
many forms of fair use as well as allow infringement.
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Jennifer Norman, Note, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive Peer-to-Peer?, 26 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 371, 392 (2003).
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17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
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See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that
the copyright owners could not obtain relief for contributory or vicarious infringement against the distributors of
P2P network software because they did not materially contribute to the infringement once they obtained actual
knowledge of it—by the time the distributors became aware of the infringement, there was nothing that could be
done to stop it); but see In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming the preliminary
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P2P network software distributors with increasing success,26 the very nature of P2P networks
prevents copyright owners from effectively enjoining their creators to stop the sharing of
infringing material.27 Typically, P2P networks do not operate from central servers that can be
shut down or controlled.28 Once a user downloads the network software, he or she shares files
directly with other users outside of the control of the network creators.

A victory in the

courtroom obtaining an injunction against operation is meaningless if it cannot be enforced.
Thus, copyright owners have been forced into a corner with only one way to fight out. They
cannot attack the parties enabling the online copyright infringement, so they must directly pursue
the actual infringers. As inefficient and distasteful as suing its own consumers for infringement
may be, the RIAA announced on June 25, 2003, that it would begin bringing actions directly
against the most “egregious infringers.”29
C.

Identifying Individual Infringers

injunction entered against Aimster by the district court, concluding that the copyright owners were likely to succeed
against Aimster on the basis of contributory infringement) and Kazaa/Buma-Stemra, Hof, Amsterdam, 28 maart
2002, rolnr. 1370/01 (holding that KaZaA is acting unlawfully by making software available that allows users to
download music files and must shut down or pay $40,000 (US) per day in fines). See also Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (holding that where a technology is capable of non-infringing
uses, the distributor of the technology will not be contributorily liable).
26

It is becoming less difficult for copyright owners to establish that P2P network operators have actual knowledge
of their users’ copyright infringement.
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Yang & Gorman, supra note 7, at 32; Alan B. Davidson, Consumer Privacy and Government Technology
Mandates in the Digital Media Marketplace, Prepared Statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation (Sept. 17, 2003) (“Widespread use of the current generation of peer-to-peer programs,
which do not include centralized servers, has forced copyright holders to go after infringing users themselves.”), at
http://www.cdt.org/testimony/030917davidson.shtml.
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Yang & Gorman, supra note 7, at 32. The Napster network, which was not truly P2P, “did require centralized
servers in order to catalog all of the information residing on all of its individual users’ computers.” Id. Thus,
following its successful lawsuit against Napster, the RIAA was able to force the network to shut down in the
summer of 2001. Id. KaZaA and the other P2P networks that have sprung up in its place, however, are much more
decentralized and virtually impossible to shut down. Id.
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RIAA Responds to Senator’s Inquiry, Says P2P Users Should Expect Low Privacy, 8 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP.
No. 32, at 794-95 (Aug. 20, 2003) [herinafter RIAA Responds] (citing an Aug. 14, 2003 letter from the RIAA to Sen.
Norman Coleman).
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Before copyright owners can sue any alleged infringers, they have to know whom to sue.
Copyright owners, such as the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), employ
agencies that use programs, known as “rangers” or “bots,” to search the shared files of computers
logged into P2P networks for infringing files.30 According to the RIAA, “The software then
downloads a sample of the infringing files, with date and time of access, and stores the user’s
Internet Protocol (IP) address.”31 These programs also record the names of all the infringing
files that they find.32 The RIAA claims that its employees manually review and verify the
information collected by the search programs before taking any action.33 Because P2P network
users operate anonymously, copyright owners are not able to directly obtain the user’s name,
address, or other identification information. The IP address, however, enables the copyright
owner to identify the user’s service provider, which does possess that information.34 Thus, to
obtain a user’s subscriber information, the copyright owner must subpoena the service provider
pursuant to Section 512(h) of the DMCA.35 The subpoena process itself will be discussed in
greater detail below.
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Matthew V. Skelton, The Verizon Cases: A First Look at the Subpoena to Identify an Infringer Under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 5 VA. INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSLINE No. 2, at 5 (June 2003), available at
www.vsb.org/sections/ip/Newsline%20June%202003%20FINAL.pdf.
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Jay Lyman, RIAA Details Subpoena Strategy, E-Commerce Times (Aug. 19, 2003), at
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/31372.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
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Skelton, supra note 30, at 5.
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17 U.S.C. § 512(h).
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Since announcing its latest strategy in June 2003, the RIAA has served well over 2,000
DMCA subpoenas, at an average of 75 per week.36 Although service providers received only a
limited number of subpoenas from copyright owners before this recent onslaught and responded
to each of them without challenge,37 several providers have reacted to this new trend with
motions to quash.38

Naturally, ISPs are extremely reluctant to freely release subscriber

information on a large scale because such a response could drive away consumers.39 Service
providers are also concerned about the potentially enormous administrative and legal costs that
would be associated with complying with a flood of such subpoenas if other copyright owners
were to follow the RIAA’s approach.40 In these cases, which will be discussed further below, the
service providers have challenged the use of the subpoena provision on various statutory,
constitutional, and policy grounds with varying success. Somewhat unusually, consumer rights
organizations and privacy advocates have aligned themselves with the service providers in
challenging the DMCA subpoena provision, albeit certainly with different motives. In any event,
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RIAA Responds, supra note 29, at 795. Based on these subpoenas, the RIAA filed a first wave of 261 lawsuits
against individual file sharers on September 8, 2003.
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Farhad Manjoo, AOL’s Jekyll and Hyde Act, Salon Technology & Business (Feb. 10, 2003), at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/02/10/aol_file_sharing/print.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004). According to
Matthew Oppenheim, RIAA’s vice president of business and legal affairs, the RIAA had only issued 96 § 512(h)
subpoenas since the passage of the DMCA before Verizon became the first ISP to challenge one. Id.
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In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003) [hereinafter
Verizon I]; In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 257 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C. 2003)
[hereinafter Verizon II]; In re Subpoena to the Mass. Inst. of Tech., No. 1:03-MC-10209-JLT (Aug. 7, 2003); In re
Subpoena to Boston College, No. 1:03-MC-10210-JLT (Aug. 7, 2003); Pacific Bell Internet Servs. v. Recording
Indus. Ass’n of America, No. C 03-3560 SI (N.D. Cal. filed July 30, 2003); In re Charter Communications, Inc.,
Subpoena Enforcement Matter, No. 4:03MC00273CEJ (E.D. Mo. filed Sept. 23, 2003). In addition, several
individual users have filed Jane Doe actions against the RIAA challenging the DMCA subpoena provision and its
interpretation by the RIAA.
39

Manjoo, supra note 37.
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District of Columbia Court Lacks Authority to Issue DMCA Subpoenas to Boston Schools, 66 ELECTRONIC COM.
& L. REP. No. 1634, at 459 (Aug. 15, 2003).
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until these issues with the subpoena provision are resolved, the process of pursuing individual
infringers will not be a smooth one for copyright owners.

III.
A.

THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

Overview and Purpose of the DMCA
Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to “facilitate the robust development and world-

wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, research, development, and education
in the digital age.”41 Title I of the DMCA, which is not the focus of this Article, amended the
Copyright Act42 to implement two recent World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
treaties, “bringing U.S. copyright law squarely into the digital age…”43 Title II was enacted to
introduce a level of certainty with respect to ISPs’ potential liability for the online copyright
infringement of their subscribers.44 It attempts to achieve this goal by clarifying exactly when a
service provider is liable for its subscribers’ transmission or storage of infringing material on its
systems and what remedies copyright owners have in such situations.45 In addition, Title II
endeavors to help ensure the growth and efficiency of the Internet and protect the interests of
copyright owners by “preserv[ing] strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners

41

S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1-2 (1998).

42

17 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq. (2000).

43

S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (discussing the implementation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty).
44

Id.

45

Id.
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to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital
networked environment.”46
The enacted version of Title II came about largely as a result of lengthy negotiations
between representatives of the major copyright owners and officials from the leading ISPs.47
When the DMCA was first proposed, it originally held service providers liable anytime one of its
subscribers posted infringing material.48 Service providers were able to negotiate a compromise,
however, whereby they would not be held liable for unwittingly hosting or transmitting
infringing material for their subscribers, as long as they cooperated with copyright owners in
combating infringement through various prescribed means.49
Title II amended chapter 5 of the Copyright Act50 to include a new section entitled,
“Limitations on liability relating to material online.”51

As its name suggests, section 512

expressly limits the liability of an ISP in specific situations where subscribers use its facilities to
commit acts of copyright infringement.52 In subsections (a) through (d), section 512 provides
service providers with “safe harbors” from direct, vicarious, and contributory liability for four
categories of activities involving infringement by users: (a) where the ISP merely acts as a

46

Id. at 37.

47

Id. at 9. “Title II…reflects 3 months of negotiations supervised by Chairman Hatch and assisted by Senator
Ashcroft among the major copyright owners and the major OSP’s and ISP’s.”

48

Jason Krause, Caught by the Act: Judge Rules ISPs Must Name Clients Who Trade Copyrighted Material, 2
A.B.A. J. E-Report 2 (2003).

49

Id.

50

17 U.S.C. §§501 et seq. (2000).

51

Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27; 17 U.S.C. § 512. This section is the heart of Title II and the source of the
DMCA subpoena provision.

52

Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
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conduit for the transmission of infringing material;53 (b) where the ISP’s system is used for the
intermediate or temporary storage of infringing material (“system caching”);54 (c) where the ISP
hosts (stores online) infringing material on its servers at the direction of users;55 and (d) where
the ISP refers or links users to the online location of infringing material via directories, index
references, hypertext links, and other tools.56 In order to qualify for the immunity offered by
these safe harbors, however, service providers must satisfy certain prescribed conditions,
depending on which safe harbor is being claimed.57 For example, each of these four provisions
essentially requires that the ISP have no actual knowledge of the infringing nature of the material
at issue.58 Also, the service provider must terminate the accounts of subscribers engaging in
repeat copyright infringement and must inform its subscribers of this policy.59 In addition to
satisfying these conditions and others, service providers must cooperate with copyright owners in
their efforts to enforce their copyrights.

Section 512 provides copyright owners with two

powerful statutory weapons for use in their fight against online infringement, both of which
require the cooperation of service providers to be effective: takedown notices60 and subpoena

53

17 U.S.C. § 512(a).

54

§ 512(b).

55

§ 512(c).

56

§ 512(d).
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Norman, supra note 23, at 392.
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See § 512(a)(1)-(2) (requiring that the transmission of the infringing material be initiated by a person other than
the ISP and that the transmission be “carried out through an automatic technical process”); § 512(b)(1)(A)-(B)
(same); § 512(c)(1)(A) (requiring that the service provider not have actual knowledge that the material or activity is
infringing); § 512(d) (same).
59

§ 512(i)(1)(A).

60

§ 512(c)(3).
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authority.61 Although this Article focuses primarily on the latter tool, a discussion of the former
is pertinent here for purposes of later comparison and understanding the overall structure of
section 512.
B.

The DMCA Takedown Provisions
Once a copyright owner discovers infringing material online in the manner described

previously in Part II, it may issue a takedown notice to the appropriate ISP to “remove or disable
access to” that material being made available by its subscriber, who is identifiable by his or her
IP address.62 The requirements for a takedown notice are delineated in the safe harbor provision
for ISPs unknowingly hosting infringing material on their servers, section 512(c).63 It must
include the following:

61

(i)

A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf
of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.

(ii)

Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or
if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a
single notification, a representative list of such works at that site.

(iii)

Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the
subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which
is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the
service provider to locate the material.

(iv)

Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact
the complaining party…

§ 512(h).

62

§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). See also § 512(b)(2)(E) (requiring the removal of infringing material from system cache upon
notification by the copyright owner); § 512(c)(1)(C) (requiring the removal of infringing material from the ISP’s
system or network upon notification by the copyright owner); § 512(d)(3) (requiring the removal of links or
references to the location of infringing material upon notification by the copyright owner). Obviously, there is no
takedown provision for infringing material that merely passes through the ISP’s system or network, although many
copyright holders have even issued takedown notices in such situations as well.
63

§ 512(c)(3).
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(v)

A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of
the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the
copyright owner, its agent, or the law.

(vi)

A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on
behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.64

Delivery of a takedown notice must occur through the service provider’s “designated agent.”65
In order for a service provider to qualify for liability protection under one of the four safe harbor
provisions, it must designate an agent to receive such takedown notifications, as well as
subpoenas.66

The service provider must make the designated agent’s contact information

available to the public, both on its website and through the Copyright Office.67 Clearly, the
purpose of this provision is to streamline the delivery process to the greatest extent practicable,
ensuring that the enforcement of the takedown notice is prompt and expeditious.68
Upon receiving a substantially compliant takedown notice, the service provider must
“remove or disable access to” the infringing material.69 If the service provider wishes to avoid
possible liability for directly removing or disabling access to allegedly infringing material
residing on its system, it must “take reasonable steps promptly to notify the subscriber that it has
removed or disabled access to the material.”70 If the service provider subsequently receives a

64

§ 512(c)(3)(A).

65

§ 512(c)(2).

66

Id.

67

Id. This contact information must include the name, address, phone number, and e-mail address of the agent. §
512(c)(2)(A).

68

Many service providers, such as Verizon, Pacific Bell, and Comcast, are extremely large corporations with a
number of administrative centers around the country. This provision avoids loss and delay by ensuring that each
takedown notification goes to the same location and is handled in the same manner.

69

§ 512(c)(1)(C).

70

§ 512(g)(2)(A).

15

counter notification from the subscriber that the allegedly infringing material was removed as a
result of mistake, it must promptly provide the copyright owner with a copy of the counter
notification and inform the copyright owner that it will replace the removed material in 10
business days unless the copyright owner pursues a court order restraining the subscriber from
engaging in infringing activity.71 If the copyright owner does not alert the service provider that it
has filed such an action, then the service provider must replace the removed material between 10
and 14 business days following the receipt of the counter notification from the subscriber.72
With the fairly recent development of P2P networks, ISPs now commonly receive
takedown notices pertaining to infringing material not residing on their systems or networks.73
In this situation, which is governed by the subsection (a) safe harbor provision, the ISPs merely
act as conduits for the transmission of the infringing material.74 Thus, they cannot directly
“remove or disable access to” the offending files.75 Section 512 does not explicitly state how
this issue should be resolved, and the DC Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that takedown

71

§ 512(g)(2)(B)-(C). The counter notification must include the following information:
(A)
A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber.
(B)
Identification of the material that has been removed or to which access has been disabled
and the location at which the material appeared before it was removed or access to it was
disabled.
(C)
A statement under penalty of perjury that the subscriber has a good faith belief that the
material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification of the
material to be removed or disabled.
(D)
The subscriber’s name, address, and telephone number…
§ 512(g)(3)(A)-(D).

72

§ 512(g)(2)(C).
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See e.g., Bob Sullivan, Hollywood Gets Tough on Copying, MSNBC (July 12, 2003) (noting that the MPAA
serves approximately 2,000 takedown notifications each week on ISPs for infringement taking place on P2P
networks), at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3078567/ (Feb. 17, 2004).
74

§ 512(a).
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Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d 1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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notices cannot properly be issued in this situation.76 At least until this opinion was delivered,
however, ISPs generally cooperated with copyright holders in this situation by warning the
offending subscriber that if he or she did not expeditiously remove the infringing material, his or
her Internet connection would be disabled.77
This takedown process contains several important safeguards, which protect both the
service provider from liability and the subscriber from improper takedowns. These safeguards
are important to note for the sake of comparison because some are strangely lacking from the
subpoena provision. First, the copyright owner must include in the takedown notice the required
information listed above, which allows the service provider to verify its accuracy.78 If the
takedown notification is not substantially compliant with these requirements,79 the service
provider is not treated as having knowledge of the claimed infringement and, thus, does not have
to remove or disable access to the allegedly infringing files.80 These requirements for the
notification are important because they allow the service provider to independently verify that
the subscriber is indeed making infringing material available online. As will be discussed
shortly, these notification requirements must also be satisfied before a copyright owner can
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Id. at 1231.

77

See Sullivan, supra note 73; Manjoo, supra note 37; Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d at 1232.
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See supra note 64 and accompanying text (quoting § 512(c)(3)(A)).
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See § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii) (defining substantial compliance).
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§ 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (“a notification…that fails to comply substantially with the provisions of subparagraph (A) shall
no
t be considered…in determining whether a service provider has actual knowledge or is aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”); § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (stating that the ISP must only
remove or disable access to allegedly infringing material upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of the
infringement).
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obtain a subpoena from the clerk of the issuing court, and is one of the few significant statutory
safeguards in the subpoena process.81
Second, the procedure for notification and takedown provided in section 512 affords
Internet users’ interests in making files and material available online with adequate due process
protection from possible mistakes or abuse on the part of copyright owners. As just described,
the requirements for the notification itself allow the service provider to act as the first line of
defense against improper takedown notices. Additionally, takedowns require the provision of
actual notice to subscribers.82 If the service provider removes or disables access to allegedly
infringing material residing on its system, it must take reasonable steps to provide prompt notice
to the subscriber.83 If the allegedly infringing material does not lie within the direct control of
the service provider, as in the case of files shared on P2P networks, the service provider’s
warning to the subscriber to personally remove the infringing files obviously serves the same
notice function.

Such notice provides the subscriber with an opportunity to evaluate and

possibly challenge the infringement allegation. The subscriber is in the best position to know
whether the relevant files are indeed infringing and to supply evidence if they are not.84 Thus,
common sense suggests that the subscriber should be given actual notice of infringement claims
and the removal of allegedly infringing files. There is, however, no such notice requirement for
the subpoena provision.

81

§ 512(h)(2)(A).

82

§ 512(g)(2)(A).

83

Id Due to the extremely short time period that subscribers are given to respond to this notice (less than 10 days
after the takedown), such notice must probably be delivered within 24 hours to be considered effective. Note that
this notice requirement does not prevent service providers from giving notice to subscribers before taking down the
allegedly infringing material, as long as the material is taken down promptly.
84

Davidson, supra note 27.
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Third, section 512 provides subscribers with two types of statutory remedies in the event
of an improper takedown. The first remedy imparts users with a cause of action against “any
person who knowingly materially misrepresents…that material or activity is infringing…”85 A
copyright holder making such a misrepresentation is liable for monetary damages, including
costs and attorneys’ fees.86 The availability of this cause of action prevents copyright owners
from abusing the takedown provision and non-copyright owners from using it merely for
purposes of harassment.
Section 512 also implies that subscribers may bring a cause of action against service
providers that improperly remove allegedly infringing material from their systems or networks.87
Subsection (g) states that service providers will not be held liable for damages resulting from
removing infringing material from their systems, regardless of whether the material is infringing,
so long as they adhere to the procedure outlined above.88 By implication, if a service provider
does not comply with this procedure in removing allegedly infringing files from its systems or
networks, the effected subscriber may realize a cause of action. This provision gives service
providers incentive to protect the interests of their subscribers, helps to ensure that service
providers will deal with claims of infringement in a fair and consistent manner, and grants
subscribers recourse with respect to improper takedowns. Together these two statutory remedies
provide users with protection from a broad range of abuse and impropriety with respect to the

85

§ 512(f)(1).

86

§ 512(f). This section cuts both ways, however, since a copyright owner may also sue a subscriber for damages
based on misrepresentation in a counter notification that material was removed or disabled by mistake or
misidentification. § 512(f)(2). A service provider may also recover any damages incurred as a result of a
misrepresentation by a copyright owner or subscriber. Id.

87

§ 512(g).

88

§ 512(g)(1).

19

takedown process. While the first remedy may also be available to those whose subscriber
information is subpoenaed based on misrepresentation, the second remedy clearly only applies to
the takedown process.
In addition to these built-in safeguards, the takedown provisions promote efficiency in
the enforcement of copyrights. The multi-step process for removal of allegedly infringing
material tailors itself to the needs and issues of the individual situation and continues only as
long as is necessary for the resolution of the conflict. The process also preserves efficiency by
providing for short deadlines and automatic, yet reversible, action. If the subscriber or copyright
owner does not respond to the notification or counter notification, respectively, that party’s
concession to the takedown or reposting is assumed.

For example, if a copyright owner

mistakenly identifies a subscriber’s file as infringing, there is no need for a lengthy challenge
process or an injunction filing.

Such a problem is easily resolved with a simple counter

notification from the subscriber to the copyright owner.89 On the other hand, when the online
material is clearly infringing, the subscriber may simply concede its removal without taking any
action at all, thus maximizing efficiency.90
The takedown process also efficiently resolves the rarer, more complicated situations that
involve less clear-cut issues of copyright infringement. The procedure allows for the efficient
production of evidence from both sides through the notification and counter notification

89

§ 512(g)(2)(B). If the takedown notice was obviously issued by mistake, the evidence provided in the counter
notification would almost certainly resolve such an error (assuming the mistake slipped past the ISP’s initial
screening of the takedown notice in the first place).

90

Id. If the subscriber does not promptly respond with a counter notification, the removed material is assumed to be
infringing and remains offline.
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provisions,91 and if the parties themselves cannot resolve the conflict, the procedure allows the
parties to bring it before the court in an injunction proceeding.92
This efficiency is extremely important within the context of online copyright
enforcement. Due to the rapid manner in which copyrighted works can be copied and distributed
worldwide, it is crucial to the interests of copyright holders that infringing files be removed from
the Internet as expeditiously as possible.93 With the vast number of Internet users worldwide, the
existence of a single infringing file on a P2P network can have major repercussions for its
copyright holder as it is disseminated in an exponential fashion.94 The large number of Internet
users and the epidemic levels of infringement also create the potential for an explosion in the
number of copyright enforcement actions brought by copyright owners.

With so much

infringement occurring, it is essential to all parties involved that the method for dealing with it be
as fast and efficient as possible. A cumbersome enforcement system might bottleneck at various
points in the process and cause undue delays. Efficiency is also a concern for a subscriber who
has had material mistakenly removed from the Internet. Oftentimes, such removed material is
significant to the subscriber’s website or business, and if it is non-infringing, it should be
replaced with all reasonable promptness. Although the takedown provision has already begun to
significantly burden ISPs, which must scramble to promptly respond to many notices at one

91

§§ 512(c)(3), (g)(3).

92

§ 512(g)(2)(C).
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Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8).

94

Motion to Enforce July 24, 2002 Subpoena Issued by this Court to Verizon Internet Services, Inc. and
Memorandum in Support Thereof at 5, Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003).
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time,95 the procedures laid out in section 512 effectively promote the important goals of
efficiency and expediency.
C.

The DMCA Subpoena Provision
Although arguably more powerful in effect, the subpoena provision in the DMCA is

actually somewhat secondary to the takedown notification provisions in at least two respects.
First, the subpoena provision has been and still is utilized with much less frequency.96 The
issuance of a subpoena implies more extreme consequences than the more passive issuance of a
takedown notification, and such a step is generally taken in anticipation of bringing some type of
legal action. Currently, subpoenas are only being issued for the subscriber information of the
more flagrant copyright infringers.97 Second, DMCA subpoenas must be served “piggybacked”
on takedown notifications. As will be described shortly, a copyright owner must serve the
appropriate ISP with a takedown notification either prior to or simultaneously with its service of
the subpoena for the infringer’s subscriber information.98 The fact that the subpoena provision
is, in certain respects, secondary to the takedown provisions is significant in shedding light on
how Congress intended it to be used.

95

See Skelton, supra note 30, at 6.

96

See Sullivan, supra note 73 (stating that the MPAA, by itself, issues approximately 2,000 takedown notices each
week). Before the RIAA introduced its new strategy in June 2003, only a very small number of subpoenas were
issued relative to takedown notifications. See Manjoo, supra note 37 (noting that the RIAA had only issued 96
section 512(h) subpoenas since the passage of the DMCA before Verizon began its challenge). Even now, the
RIAA has only issued a few thousand subpoenas since launching its massive campaign and the subpoenas are being
issued in conjunction with takedown notifications. RIAA Subpoenas Halted, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Dec. 1,
2003), at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaasubpoenas/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
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RIAA Responds, supra note 29.
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17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(5) (2000) (“Upon receipt of the issued subpoena, either accompanying or subsequent to the
receipt of a [takedown] notification…, the service provider shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner…the
information required by the subpoena…regardless of whether the service provider responds to the notification.”).
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The authority to obtain and serve a subpoena under the DMCA is found in section 512(h).
Once a copyright owner discovers a probable infringer, it must prepare and submit a notification,
just as it would for a typical takedown request.99 The copyright owner may then request from the
clerk of the issuing court a subpoena for the subscriber information of the allegedly infringing
user.100 This request must be filed with the following:
(A)

a copy of a notification described in subsection (c)(3)(A) [the takedown
notification];

(B)

a proposed subpoena; and

(C)

a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for which the subpoena
is sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such
information will only be used for the purpose of protecting rights under
this title.101

Upon receiving this request, the clerk of the court must “expeditiously issue and sign the
proposed subpoena and return it to the requester for delivery to the service provider” if it
properly satisfies these three requirements.102 At no point in the process does the clerk exercise
any independent discretion in evaluating the subpoena nor does a judge ever become involved at
this stage.103

Once the clerk issues the subpoena, the copyright owner serves it on the

appropriate designated agent of the service provider.104 Upon receipt of the subpoena, “the
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Id. See also supra note 65 and accompanying text (quoting the requirements for the takedown notification).

100

§ 512(h)(1).

101

§ 512(h)(2)(A)-(C).
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§ 512(h)(4) (“If the notification filed satisfies the provisions of subsection (c)(3)(A), the proposed subpoena is in
proper form, and the accompanying declaration is properly executed, the clerk shall expeditiously issue and sign the
proposed subpoena and return it to the requester for delivery to the service provider.”).
103

Verizon II, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 250. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(3) (describing similar procedures for the
issuance of a federal subpoena).

104

§ 512(c)(2). Although subsection (c)(2) does not expressly provide that the subpoena must be served on the
designated agent, it is a logical conclusion because subsection (c)(2) requires the takedown notification to be
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service provider shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner…the information required
by the subpoena, notwithstanding any other provision of law and regardless of whether the
service provider responds to the [takedown] notification.”105
Together with the structure of section 512, this language makes it very clear that there is
no formal statutory process in place for contesting the appropriateness of the subpoena
comparable to that provided for challenging a takedown notification.106 Such an appeal process
would seem to be even more necessary with respect to a subpoena because the release of a
subscriber’s identity cannot be undone. Erroneously removed Internet content can be replaced,
but identity information cannot be unlearned. Thus, it is important that such information not be
released erroneously in the first place. Additionally, section 512(h) does not require service
providers to give notice to subscribers whose information has been subpoenaed under the
DMCA, which only compounds the problem and makes the inappropriate or mistaken release of
identity information that much more likely.107
Once a service provider receives a section 512(h) subpoena requesting the identification
information of one of its subscribers, it basically has two options: respond to the subpoena with
the appropriate information or challenge the subpoena with a motion to quash. As mentioned
above, until the RIAA announced its new strategy to pursue actions directly against individual

delivered to the designated agent and subsection (h)(5) requires the subpoena to be served on the service provider
either accompanying or subsequent to the delivery of the notification. Id.; § 512(h)(5).
105

§ 512(h)(5).

106

Section 512(h) does not contain a procedure similar to that found in subsection (g) for challenging the removal of
allegedly infringing material.

107

Davidson, supra note 27. Note, however, that nothing in section 512 expressly prevents a service provider from
giving notice to its subscribers if their information has been subpoenaed.
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infringers, service providers always chose the first option.108 Realizing that a dangerous new
trend was in the offing, Verizon Internet Services created quite a stir in the legal community
when it became one of the first ISPs to bring a significant challenge to a subpoena issued under
section 512(h).109 Several other service providers, including two major universities, which act as
service providers to their faculty and students, have followed Verizon’s lead in filing motions to
quash subpoenas served on them by the RIAA.110

These cases have raised various

interpretational issues and perceived problems—both constitutional and statutory—with respect
to the DMCA provision. Before Part IV discusses these issues, challenges, and the cases in
which they have been raised, it is crucial to understand why this conflict between the service
providers and copyright holders over section 512 arose in the first place.
D.

How was the DMCA Supposed to Work?
Clearly, there is serious confusion concerning just how the subpoena provision was

intended to operate within the context of section 512.

The existence of this confusion is

somewhat surprising considering that the two adversaries in this conflict, the music recording
industry and the ISPs, were significantly responsible for the enacted version of section 512.111
These two sides worked together with legislators to craft a set of laws that would allow for the
enforcement of copyrights and protect service providers from liability for their customers’
violations. There would seem to be no rational explanation for conflict or confusion in a
108

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (noting that this case, which involved the interpretation of the DMCA subpoena
provision, presented an issue of first impression).
110

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

111

S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 9. Indeed, representatives of Verizon and the RIAA were personally involved in the
negotiation of section 512. Declan McCullagh, Verizon’s Copyright Campaign, CNET News.com (Aug. 27, 2002)
(interview with Sarah Deutsch, Vice President & Associate General Counsel, Verizon Internet Services, Inc.), at
http://news.com/2008-1082-955417.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
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compromise to which these parties willingly agreed in the first place. Granted, various factors
have arisen that neither side could have anticipated when negotiating the compromise that
became Section 512 of the DMCA,112 but could recent technological developments by
themselves have stirred up the turmoil that surrounds the DMCA subpoena provision today?
The answer to this question seems to lie in the additional fact that none of these issues
arose until the RIAA announced its new strategy of suing individual infringers on a national
scale.113 No longer are the copyright holders merely issuing subpoenas in conjunction with
takedown notices for infringing material actually residing on service providers’ systems or
networks. Copyright holders are now issuing subpoenas for the identity of subscribers merely
transmitting infringing material via their service providers’ networks, activity that is covered
under subsection 512(a).114 This would not have been possible, at least not on a large scale,
before the development of bots and P2P networks.

Before these two recent technological

developments, copyright owners really had no method or tool for discovering infringing material
unless it was physically posted on the Internet, which would generally require that the material
reside on the systems or networks of the infringer’s ISP.115 In these situations, copyright owners
would simply issue takedown notices to the appropriate service providers pursuant to section
512(c) and occasionally serve subpoenas in the rarer event that the notices were ignored or the

112

Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 23 (noting that the development of both P2P software and bots had not yet occurred
and were not anticipated at the time of the DMCA’s discussion and enactment). Without a doubt, these two factors
played a significant role in creating the immense conflict currently raging between service providers and copyright
owners, but they were likely more in the nature of catalysts than causes.
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See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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McCullagh, supra note 111.
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Tools able to search through material as it is sent and received by a service provider, known as “packet sniffers,”
remain cutting-edge technology and are not readily available to the public.
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copyright holder felt a lawsuit was warranted by the seriousness of the infringement.116 It
appears that at least the service providers expected that this was how section 512, and especially
the subpoena provision, was intended and would continue to operate.

This perspective is

supported by Verizon’s repeated arguments that section 512 was primarily intended as a notice
and takedown provision and that the subpoena authority is restricted to situations involving
infringing materials actually residing on service providers’ systems or networks.117
The introduction of P2P networks and search bots changed the entire context of section
512 and how it could be used to enforce copyrights. In addition to creating centralized lists of
digital files available for sharing, P2P networks also essentially created readily available,
searchable lists of infringement and infringers. The employment of search bots and rangers has
made the task of combing these networks for infringement extremely fast and efficient.118 These
two developments have allowed copyright owners to begin seeking out infringing activity
covered under the subsection (a) safe harbor provision—involving the transmission of infringing
material over the systems and networks of service providers—in addition to infringement
covered under subsection (c)—involving the storage of infringing material on the service
provider’s systems or networks. Of course, infringing material was transmitted over service
providers’ networks long before P2P networks appeared on the digital transfer scene,119 but
copyright owners really had no method of tracking such traffic. Ironically, the development of
116

Wikipedia, Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OCILLA (last
visited Feb. 17, 2004).
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See e.g., Manjoo, supra note 37 (quoting Sarah Deutsch, associate general counsel for Verizon: “I was one of the
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See Skelton, supra note 30, at 5.
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P2P networks, which enabled users to more easily engage in copyright infringement, also
enabled copyright owners to more easily discover such infringement.
The development of P2P networks and search bots has thus wrought several major
changes in the manner in which copyrights are enforced online. Most importantly, copyright
owners are now taking action against users merely transmitting infringing files across their
service providers’ networks as well as those users actually uploading infringing files onto their
service providers’ systems for hosting purposes. Once copyright owners realized that the first
type of infringement far outweighed the second type, it was only a matter of time before they
responded accordingly by issuing section 512(h) subpoenas.120
Due to the fact that no one expected that subsection 512(a) would ever serve as a basis
for exercising the subpoena authority like subsection 512(c),121 a fierce debate has risen as to
whether copyright holders may issue a subpoena for the identity of a subscriber who merely
transfers infringing materials across a provider’s network, but does not store such materials on
the provider’s servers. Copyright owners argue that the power to issue subpoenas to service
providers protected under subsection (a) has always existed in section 512, regardless of whether
such use was foreseen. They reason that, by including in section 512 each of the four safe harbor
subsections that limit the liability of service providers, Congress intended to protect from
secondary liability the gamut of service provider functions that could be used by subscribers to
engage in infringement.122 At the same time, Congress also intended to give copyright owners
recourse, through the help of service providers, against infringers in each of those four
120

Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (noting that P2P networks provide the largest opportunity for online copyright
infringement).
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Verizon Appeal, 351 F.3d at 1238.
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Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
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situations.123

The fact that copyright owners did not have until recently the capabilities

necessary to take advantage of that recourse in one or more of those prescribed situations does
not mean that the recourse never existed.124
On the other hand, ISPs contend that the language of section 512 precludes the issuance
of a subpoena to a service provider merely acting as a conduit for the transmission of infringing
material across its networks.125 Pursuant to the subpoena provision, the proposed subpoena
offered to the Clerk of the Court must contain a copy of a takedown notification.126 Such a
notification must identify the material “to be removed or access to which is to be disabled” by
the service provider.127 The service providers maintain that satisfaction of these requirements is
impossible in situations falling under subsection (a).128 Their argument is essentially that where
a subscriber is merely transmitting infringing material over their networks, the ISP does not
possess the ability to remove or disable access to such material, which is not on its servers.129
Thus, there can be no proper takedown notification under subsection (a) and, hence, no subpoena
based on that subsection.130 Significantly, the fact that subsection (a) never even refers to the

123

Id. at 34.
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Part IV.A.1, infra, will discuss how the structure and legislative history may support this conclusion that the
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takedown notification, while subsections (b) through (d) do, supports the service providers’
argument.131
Neither party could have anticipated that the subpoena power would be used in the
manner in which it is currently being employed, and now the service providers are fighting a
monster that they themselves helped to create. Now that the issue of how section 512 was
intended to work has been addressed, a vital question still remains: how should section 512
work? An answer to this question may not provide a resolution for all the issues that have been
raised against the DMCA subpoena provision, but it may help the legislature to understand the
need for changes in the provision and what those changes should be. Beginning the journey
toward this goal, Part IV will discuss the various issues that have been raised with respect to the
DMCA subpoena provision, highlighting the arguments of both the service providers and
copyright owners in the recent cases, as well as the opinions of the courts.

IV.

ISSUES REGARDING THE CURRENTLY ENACTED DMCA SUBPOENA PROVISION

The cases in which service providers have challenged subpoenas issued pursuant to
section 512(h) have involved issues falling into three primary categories: (1) statutory
construction issues, (2) constitutional issues, and (3) policy issues concerning the provision’s
potential for abuse.132 Initially, the major service providers were hesitant to raise constitutional
issues with respect to the subpoena provision because they had played such an integral role in the
original drafting process of Title II of the DMCA.133 Instead, the service providers focused on
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statutory construction and interpretation issues, leaving the constitutional issues to be argued by
privacy and consumer rights advocates, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the
Center for Democracy & Technology, in their amicus curiae briefs.134 The service providers
quickly realized, however, that they would need all the legal ammunition they could acquire to
levy a successful challenge against the subpoena provision and they began objecting to the
subpoenas on several constitutional grounds as well.135 Each of these challenges to the DMCA
subpoena power will be discussed in turn.
A.

Statutory Construction Issues
1.

To What Types of ISPs does the Subpoena Provision Apply?

In the first Verizon case, which has been referred to in this Article as Verizon I, the
service provider primarily argued that the section 512(h) subpoena provision did not apply to it
because it was serving only as a conduit for the infringing activity of the subscriber at issue.136
Verizon contended that it merely provided Internet access to the allegedly infringing subscriber
and that the subpoena provision was only intended to apply to service providers actually hosting
the allegedly infringing material on their systems or networks.137 Because its activities fell
within the scope of the safe harbor provision in subsection (a) for service providers acting as a
conduit for the transmission of infringing material, not within the scope of the safe harbor
provision in subsection (c) for service providers hosting infringing material on their systems or
134

See e.g., Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 41-42 (noting that Verizon did not assert that the section 512(h) subpoena
power is unconstitutional; those issues were only raised by the amici curiae supporting Verizon).
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in subsection (c)).

31

networks, Verizon argued that the takedown notification provision, which is found within
subsection (c)(3)(A), did not apply to it and consequently neither did the subpoena provision.138
On the other hand, the RIAA argued that the subpoena provision and subsection
(c)(3)(A), detailing the requirements for the notification provision, are freestanding provisions,
which are referenced in several other areas outside of subsection (c).139 Thus, according to the
RIAA, the notification and subpoena provisions apply to service providers engaging in each of
the four types of activities granted safe harbor under the DMCA, not merely to service providers
that are actually hosting infringing material on their systems or networks.140 Based on this
interpretation, the subpoena was valid no matter which safe harbor Verizon fell under.141
Finding none of Verizon’s arguments entirely persuasive, the District Court for the
District of Columbia adopted the RIAA’s interpretation of section 512.142 The court supported
its decision with a convincing array of reasons. First, the court found that “[t]he statutory text of
the DMCA provides clear guidance for construing the subpoena authority of subsection (h) to
apply to all service providers under the act.”143 The term “service provider” is clearly referenced
throughout the subpoena provision.144

Significantly, section 512 provides two distinct

definitions of service provider in a freestanding definition section: “a narrow definition as the
term is used solely within subsection (a), and a broader definition governing all other
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subsections, which specifically includes a “service provider” under subsection (a) as well.”145
Based on this express two-part definition of “service provider” found in subsection (k), the court
found it clear that the broader, all-encompassing definition applies to the term as it is used in the
subsection (h) subpoena provision.146 Thus, it held that the subpoena provision applies to all
service providers, including those engaged in activities described in each of the safe harbor
provisions.147
Second, the court held that Verizon’s interpretation was strained and conflicted with the
overall structure of section 512 because the subsection (c)(3)(A) notification provision is
referenced in several other places in section 512 outside of the subsection (c) safe harbor
provision.148 Thus, the notification provision must necessarily apply outside of the context of
subsection (c) and its safe harbor for ISPs hosting infringing material on their systems and
networks.149 In addition, the section 512(h) subpoena provision is not limited or restricted in any
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(k)
Definitions.
(1)
Service provider.
(A)
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(B)
As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term “service
provider” means a provider of online services or network access, or the
operator of facilities therefore, and includes an entity described in
subparagraph (A).
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fashion to service providers covered under subsection (c).150 The subpoena provision is located
in a freestanding subsection and is in no way solely tied to service providers falling within the
scope of subsection (c).151
Finally, the court noted that Verizon’s interpretation conflicted with Congressional intent
with respect to section 512.152 If Verizon’s interpretation were adopted, “the statute would fail
significantly to address many contexts in which a copyright owner needs to utilize the subpoena
process in order to discern the identity of an apparent copyright infringer.”153

Verizon’s

interpretation would prevent a copyright owner from having any recourse against a subscriber
who merely used his or her Internet service for the transmission of infringing files. Thus,
Verizon’s interpretation “would create a huge loophole in Congress’s effort to prevent copyright
infringement on the Internet,” through which infringing users of P2P networks would be able to
escape liability.154 Clearly, Congress could not have intended such an effect.
Supporting its holding textually, structurally, and with legislative intent, the Verizon I
court convincingly laid Verizon’s interpretation of section 512 to rest. On appeal, however, the
DC Circuit reversed the trial court’s decision and resurrected Verizon’s position based on a
textual analysis.155 The Court of Appeals analyzed section 512 in the same manner as the district
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court, looking to the text and the structure of the statute before turning to the legislative intent
and purpose, but focused on different elements of the statute to arrive at the opposite conclusion.
Beginning its opinion with an examination of the text of section 512, the court agreed
with Verizon’s argument that the subpoena provision does not apply to service providers acting
merely as a conduit for P2P communications.156 The court reasoned that the statute expressly
provides that the issuance of a subpoena under section 512(h) requires a takedown
notification,157 which must identify the allegedly infringing material “that is to be removed or
access to which is to be disabled.”158 The takedown notification requirement is a condition
precedent to the issuance of a subpoena under section 512(h).159 Because Verizon was merely
acting as a conduit for the transmission of infringing material on P2P networks and was not
storing the infringing material on its server, the RIAA could not identify material to be removed
or access to which is to be disabled.160 A service provider merely acting as a conduit for the
transmission of infringing material can neither “remove” nor “disable access to” the material
because it is not stored on the provider’s servers.161 Since it does not control the content on its
subscribers’ computers, it cannot actually remove or disable access to the infringing material.162
Since this crucial requirement for the takedown notification cannot be satisfied where the service
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provider is merely acting as a conduit, the takedown notification requirement for obtaining a
subpoena cannot be met, and thus no subpoena may be issued.163
The RIAA contended that a service provider can disable access to infringing material “by
terminating the offending subscriber’s Internet account.”164 The court rejected this argument
based on the fact that Congress expressly treated disabling a subscriber’s access to infringing
material and disabling access to the Internet as two distinct remedies.165 The court compared
section 512(j)(1)(A)(i), which authorizes an injunction restraining an ISP “from providing access
to infringing material,” with section 521(j)(1)(A)(ii), which authorizes an injunction restraining
an ISP “from providing access to a subscriber or account holder…who is engaging in fringing
activity…by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder.”166

Noting that

“where different terms are used in a single piece of legislation, the court must presume that
Congress intended the terms have different meanings,” the court concluded that the provision of
these two distinct remedies establishes that “terminating a subscriber’s account is not the same as
removing or disabling access by others to the infringing material resident on the subscriber’s
computer.”167
The Court of Appeals further bolstered its opinion with an analysis of the structure of
section 512.168

Verizon noted that section 512(h), the subpoena provision, specifically

references the takedown notification provision, which is found in subsection (c), but does not
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explicitly reference subsections (a), (b), or (d).169

Verizon thus argued that the subpoena

provision only applies to situations governed by subsection (c), where the service provider hosts
the infringing material on its servers.170 Despite rejecting Verizon’s overly broad contention that
the subpoena provision only applies to section 512(c) cases, the court agreed with Verizon’s
narrower conclusion that it does not apply to section 512(a).171 The court pointed out that
subsections (b) and (d), which govern a service provider’s temporary storage of infringing
material on its systems and a service provider’s hosting of a tool linking users to infringing
material, respectively, both cross-reference the takedown notification provision upon which the
subpoena provision relies.172 Thus, the court concluded that the subpoena provision also applies
to subsections (b) and (d).173 This rationale is logical because, as the court noted, all three
subsections involve a service provider’s storage of infringing material on its servers in some
capacity.174 Subsection (a), however, does not involve such storage, but rather the transmission
of infringing material. As described above, because the service provider does not have the
ability to remove or disable access to infringing material not stored on its systems or network, it
makes sense that subsection (a) does not reference the takedown provision and that the subpoena
provision does not apply to subsection (a).175
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Looking to the purpose and legislative intent behind section 512, the court did note that it
was unfortunate that Congress was not able to anticipate the creation of P2P technology and
accordingly draft legislation that would fully protect copyrights from digital infringement.176
The court held that despite the fact that Congress likely did not intend to leave such a broad
loophole in the copyright enforcement law, it is not the place of the courts to “rewrite the DMCA
in order to make it fit a new and unforeseen Internet architecture, no matter how damaging that
development has been to the music industry…”177 The court concluded that this problem must
be addressed by Congress because only “‘Congress has the constitutional authority and the
institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are
inevitably implicated by such new technology.’”178
Although the Court of Appeal’s decision seems somewhat unfair from a policy
perspective, it was the right one in terms of balancing long-term interests. The court recognized
the harm that illegal P2P file sharing has done to the entertainment industry, but correctly
concluded that it did not have the resources to properly take into account the many competing
interests and the high stakes involved.179 This decision properly placed the weight of resolving
the many issues that have arisen with respect to the DMCA subpoena provision squarely on the
shoulders of Congress, where it belongs. As of the time that this case was decided, Congress had
already begun to address the task of updating digital copyright protection legislation to deal with
P2P technology.180 Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals did not address the constitutional
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challenges that Verizon brought against the subpoena provision, which were rejected by the
district court.181 Analyses of these issues would have been well within the court’s province and
would have provided Congress with valuable guidance in restructuring section 512.
2.

Does Section 512(h) trump Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

Another significant constructional issue relates to the interpretation of the DMCA in the
context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The section 512(h) subpoena provision grants
copyright owners enhanced subpoena authority that is significantly greater than that offered by
Rule 45.182 One of the major debates regarding the confluence of these two subpoena provisions
is whether the DMCA subpoena power trumps the geographic limitation requirements set out in
Rule 45.183 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) first raised this issue in court after
it received a subpoena from the RIAA demanding the subscriber information of an allegedly
infringing student.184 Before analyzing this case, it is necessary to briefly describe the provisions
relating to service and delivery of subpoenas under both Rule 45 and section 512.
Section 512(h) provides that “[a] copyright owner…may request the clerk of any United
States district court to issue a subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged
infringer…”185

It further mandates that “the procedure for issuance and delivery of the

subpoena, and the remedies for noncompliance with the subpoena, shall be governed to the
greatest extent practicable by those provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing
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the issuance, service, and enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum.”186 Rule 45 is the relevant
provision pertaining to subpoenas duces tecum in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It states
that “a subpoena for production or inspection shall issue from the court for the district in which
the production or inspection is to be made.”187 In addition, a subpoena may be served at any
place within the district of the issuing court or at any place outside the district that is within 100
miles of the location where the subpoena is served.188 Rule 45, however, also states that “when a
statute of the United States provides therefor, the court upon proper application and cause shown
may authorize the service of a subpoena at any other place.”189 Basically, Rule 45 allows federal
law to mandate nationwide service of process when appropriate.
In the case of In re Subpoena to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,190 MIT
initially noted in its memorandum in support of its motion to quash that section 512(h) requires
that “‘the procedure for issuance and delivery’ of any subpoena issued pursuant to the DMCA
‘shall be governed to the greatest extent practicable by those provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure governing the issuance, service, and enforcement of a subpoena duces
tecum.’”191

Accordingly, MIT argued that the subpoena served by the RIAA violated the
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geographic limitations imposed by Rule 45 because they were issued from the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia and served on MIT in Massachusetts to produce
documents in Washington, D.C.192 According to MIT, the RIAA’s subpoena did not comport
with the restrictions of Rule 45 for either the issuance or the service of subpoenas duces tecum.
First, Rule 45(a)(2) provides that a subpoena for the production of documents must issue from
the court for the district in which the production is to be made. 193 In this case, the subpoena
issued from Washington, D.C., but the production was to be made from Massachusetts. Second,
the RIAA’s subpoena violated the rule governing service, which provides that subpoenas must be
served within the district of the issuing court.194 Although Rule 45(b)(2) also provides that
subpoenas may be served outside the district from which they issue, this option only applies if
the place of service is “within 100 miles of the place of the…production specified in the
subpoena.”195 Because Massachusetts, the place of service, is clearly more than 100 miles from
Washington, D.C, the place of production, the option does not apply. MIT noted that Rules
45(a)(2) and (b)(2) together “require that a subpoena duces tecum be issued from a convenient
United States District Court, so that a third-party like MIT may seek judicial assistance without
the burden of traveling to a distant district.”196 MIT contended that the RIAA’s subpoena should
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be quashed because it violated both the rules governing the issuance and service of subpoenas
duces tecum and the policies underlying those rules.197
In its motion to enforce the subpoena, the RIAA responded with several
counterarguments to these issues that MIT raised in its motion to quash. First, the RIAA
contended that subpoenas issued pursuant to the DMCA are not subject to the territorial
limitations imposed on subpoenas issued pursuant to Rule 45 because “Congress intended the
DMCA subpoena process to be streamlined and expeditious to fulfill its functions.”198 The
DMCA subpoenas, the RIAA argued, “are not broad discovery mechanisms” like Rule 45
subpoenas, but rather “are targeted to ensure that a discrete amount of information is made
available for the limited purpose of enabling a copyright owner to pursue its rights.”199 Based
on clear Congressional intent, DMCA subpoenas must enable copyright owners to enforce their
rights quickly and efficiently “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”200 According to the
RIAA, MIT’s interpretation conflicts with this intent by slowing and burdening the DMCA
subpoena process. Essentially, MIT’s interpretation would force copyright owners “to have
counsel in every one of the 94 judicial districts, ready at a moment’s notice to serve
subpoenas.”201
The RIAA claimed that this conclusion is also supported by the language of section
512(h)(6), which states that “unless otherwise provided by this section…, the procedure for
197
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issuance and delivery of the subpoena…shall be governed to the greatest extent practicable0” by
Rule 45.202 This language, according to the RIAA, makes it clear that although the procedures of
Rule 45 generally apply to subpoenas issued pursuant to the DMCA, Rule 45 is inapplicable
“whenever it would conflict with section 512(h) or when application of Rule 45 would not be
practicable, given the goals that section 512(h) advances.”203

The application of the

geographical restrictions in this case would thwart the goals of section 512(h) and the purpose of
the DMCA.204
Second, the RIAA contended that even if traditional service under Rule 45 would
normally be required for DMCA subpoenas, the DMCA authorizes nationwide service of
process. In cases involving the enforcement of federal law, Congress has the power to authorize,
either expressly or impliedly, nationwide service of process,205 and Section 512(h)(1) of the
DMCA authorizes the issuance of subpoenas by the “clerk of any United States district court.”206
The RIAA based its contention on various cases involving subpoena provisions within other
federal statutes, such as the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).207 The RIAA argued
that these cases suggest that the determination of whether a statute authorizes nationwide service
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depends on the policy goals of the particular statute and whether nationwide service is necessary
to effectuate those goals.208
With respect to the RIAA’s second argument, MIT countered that the phrase “any United
States district court” merely signifies “that a copyright holder need not go to any particular court
to issue a DMCA subpoena, but may instead have it issued from any district in the federal court
system that has authority to issue such a subpoena. Citing to Robertston v. Railroad Labor
Board, MIT noted that the U.S. Supr eme Court expressly rejected the RIAA’s contention when it
held that the phrase, “any District Court of the United States,” merely referred to “a court that
has jurisdiction under otherwise applicable rules to issue the subpoena.”209 MIT also attempted
to distinguish several of the cases cited by the RIAA based on the fact that they involved statutes
that much more explicitly authorized nationwide service of process.210 Quoting Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation v. Abrams,211 MIT concluded, “Congress knows how to authorize
nationwide service of process when it wants to provide for it. That Congress failed to do
so…argues forcefully that such an authorization was not its intention.”212
The issue of whether the DMCA subpoena power trumps the procedural requirements
mandated by Rule 45 remains essentially unresolved. While the Massachusetts district court
granted MIT’s motion to quash, it did so in a single sentence opinion, which did little to shed
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light on how the courts will approach this issue in the future.213 Instead of challenging the
Massachusetts district court’s order, it appears that the RIAA will simply refile for a second
subpoena in that court,214 which will delay a more substantial resolution of this issue until it is
raised again.
It is difficult to predict which side the courts will favor on this issue. Comparing the
arguments of the RIAA and MIT in this case, each has its strengths, but MIT’s interpretation
appears to be the more sound of the two. A purely textual reading seems to support MIT’s
position that a subpoena issued pursuant to the DMCA must comply with the geographical
limitations of Rule 45, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Robertson, which
held that the phrase relied on by the RIAA does not by itself authorize nationwide service.215 In
addition, section 512(h)(6) clearly states that the procedure for issuance and delivery of the
DMCA subpoena is to be governed by the provisions of Rule 45, unless otherwise provided by
section 512. Outside of subsection 512(h), the only provision discussing procedure for issuance
or delivery may be found in subsection (c)(2), which establishes that takedown notifications must
be delivered to the service provider’s designated agent.216 Nothing in the language of section
512 expressly conflicts with the application of Rule 45. Textually, there is little support for the
RIAA’s interpretation that the geographical limitations of Rule 45 do not apply to DMCA
subpoenas.
213
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From a policy perspective, however, the RIAA raises a legitimate point that one of the
primary purposes of section 512 is to enable the enforcement of copyrights in an expedient
manner.217 But would the imposition of the geographical limitations of Rule 45 significantly
obstruct this goal as the RIAA contends?218 Although the RIAA was guilty of exaggeration
when it suggested that such restrictions would require copyright owners “to have counsel in
every one of the 94 judicial districts, ready at a moment’s notice to serve subpoenas,” imposing
the geographical limitations of Rule 45 would indeed place a large burden on copyright
owners.219 Once the conflict concerning the interpretation of section 512 has been substantially
resolved, the number of valid and accurate subpoenas will almost certainly be far greater than the
number of erroneous subpoenas that must be challenged. This would suggest, in the interest of
efficiency, that the RIAA’s interpretation be adopted. Rather than forcing copyright owners to
obtain subpoenas from different jurisdictions each time a new service provider is involved,
efficiency would be maximized by forcing the service provider to challenge the subpoena in the
issuing court in the much rarer event that a subpoena is invalidly or mistakenly issued.
For example, copyright owner X issues DMCA subpoenas to three different service
providers in districts A, B, and C. Only the subpoena to the service provider in district C is
mistakenly issued. If the geographic limitations of Rule 45 were imposed, then X would have to
retain counsel in each of those three jurisdictions to obtain and serve the three subpoenas, which
would be a substantial burden. The service provider in C, however, would not be significantly
burdened in challenging the subpoena it received in the district C court. Essentially, in this
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situation, the three subpoenas would result in a total of three substantial burdens, all falling on
the shoulders of the copyright owner, X.
On the other hand, if the geographic limitations of Rule 45 were not applied to DMCA
subpoenas, then X would merely serve each of the three service providers with subpoenas issued
from the court in X’s district. Because the subpoenas issued to the service providers in districts
A and B are accurate, there would be no substantial burden as a result of their compliance.220 If
the service provider in district C were unable to convince X that the subpoena issued to it was
invalid or mistaken, then the service provider would have to retain counsel in X’s district to
challenge the subpoena. Thus, under the same circumstances, the three subpoenas would only
result in at most one substantial burden, this time falling on the shoulders of the service provider
in district C.
This rather lengthy example demonstrates that the RIAA’s interpretation would likely be
more efficient in the long term when all the parties are taken into account. This is especially true
considering that the ratio of proper to erroneous DMCA subpoenas is likely greater than 2 to 1.
Excluding the geographic limitations of Rule 45 would also allow for more expeditious
enforcement of copyrights, thereby affording more protection for copyright owners.
It is not clear from the text of the DMCA or from its legislative history whether Congress
intended such a result.221 Due to the conflicting case law raised by the two sides, this issue is
much better resolved by Congress. Congress could easily amend section 512(h)(6) to explicitly
incorporate or exclude the geographical limitations of Rule 45, as it has done for other federal
220
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statutes.222 While excluding these limitations would significantly burden service providers in the
short term until the conflict surrounding the subpoena provision is resolved, it would likely be a
much more efficient approach in the long run. In addition, as will be suggested later in this
Article, Congress could include an express provision in the DMCA requiring copyright owners
to compensate service providers for unduly burdensome subpoenas, thereby shifting the financial
burden at least somewhat back to the copyright owners.223
B.

Constitutional Issues
In addition to the issues relating to the construction and interpretation of section 512, a

number of constitutional challenges have been levied against the subpoena provision. These
challenges have centered on Article III and the First and Fifth Amendments. Privacy advocates
argue that the DMCA subpoena provision unconstitutionally implicates the rights to free speech
and due process of law in addition to violating the Article III “case or controversy”
requirement.224
1.

Violation of the Article III Case or Controversy Requirement?

Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the exercise of federal
judicial authority to situations involving “cases” or “controversies.”225

This restriction is

generally interpreted to mean that federal courts may only resolve legal questions arising out of
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actual disputes between real parties.226 In Verizon II, the ISP argued that the DMCA subpoena
provision violates Article III because “it authorizes federal courts to issue subpoenas in the
absence of a pending case or controversy.”227 Verizon maintained that “[a]n ex parte request for
a subpoena duces tecum is not in itself a ‘case or controversy’ within the meaning of Article III”
because it neither names an adverse party nor seeks any form of judicial relief or decree.228
Because “the power to issue subpoenas exists only in the context of a case that is properly
pending before a federal court,” Verizon concluded that subpoenas issued pursuant to the DMCA
are unenforceable under Article III.229
The court rejected each of Verizon’s contentions based on several grounds. Initially, the
court noted that “the clerk’s issuance of a section 512(h) subpoena does not involve either the
exercise of judicial power or the exercise by federal judges of…investigatory power,” and thus
could not be construed as an act of the court.230 The court pointed out that the clerk exercises no
discretion and merely executes a ministerial duty.231 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court
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Id. at 12. Verizon quoted the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion
Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988):
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 45 grants a district court the power to issue subpoenas as to
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underlying action, and the process was not issued in aid of determining that jurisdiction, then the
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76.
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has long “distinguished between actions that are ministerial in nature and those that constitute an
exercise of judicial, legislative, or discretionary executive power.”232 Quoting Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Custiss v. Georgetown & Alexandria Turnpike Co., the court stated that “the
legislature may direct the clerk of a court to perform a specified service, without making his act
the act of the court.”233 From a practical perspective, reasoned the court, no Article III judge
takes any action with respect to a DMCA subpoena until the copyright owner moves to enforce it
or the service provider moves to quash it.234 Once either of these actions occurs, an actual
controversy exists sufficient to confer jurisdiction under Article III.235
Verizon expressly opposed this reasoning, arguing that subpoenas are issued in the name
of the court and should be treated as acts of the court.236 In response, the court held that there is
a distinction between subpoenas issued by express order of a judge and subpoenas issued by the
clerk of the court.237 The court found that this distinction supported the view that the issuance of
a subpoena by a clerk of the court is merely “a ministerial task accomplished without judicial
involvement…”238
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Id. at 250 (citing Custiss v. Georgetown & Alexandria Turnpike Co., 10 U.S. 233, 237 (1810)).

233
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The court further stated that even if the issuance of a DMCA subpoena could be
characterized as a judicial act, Verizon’s Article III challenge would still fail for two reasons.239
First, “Congress has enacted several provisions that specifically authorize the clerk of the district
court to issue subpoenas despite the absence of a pending case or controversy in the federal
courts.”240 Second, aside from the subpoenas authorized in these provisions, “‘federal courts and
judges have long performed a variety of functions that…do not necessarily or directly involve
adversarial proceedings within a trial or appellate court.”241 The court drew an analogy to Rule
27(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows a court to order the deposition of a
witness before an action is filed, where doing so would “prevent a failure or delay of justice.”242
Under both of these provisions, “private parties may avail themselves of judicial machinery to
obtain information prior to the filing of a complaint…if they satisfy a specific set of criteria and
identify with particularity the information they seek to compel.”243
In its supporting brief, Verizon rejected this analogy, which was indirectly raised by the
RIAA.244 Verizon noted that Rule 27(a) requires a demonstration that the petitioner for such an
order expects to be a party to an action that it is presently unable to bring or cause to be
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Id. (citing, among other statutes, 2 U.S.C. § 388 (2000) (“subpoenas for depositions in connection with
proceedings in the House of Representatives”); 35 U.S.C. § 24 (2000) (“subpoenas for evidence to be used in
connection with proceedings in Patent and Trademark Office”); 45 U.S.C. § 157(h) (“subpoenas at the request of
arbitrators under the Railway Labor Act”)).
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brought.245 Section 512(h) contains no similar intent to file suit requirement, which makes it less
certain that the judicial action in issuing a DMCA subpoena would relate to an actual action in
federal court.246 Indeed, Verizon pointed out that the RIAA has expressly stated that it “merely
wishes to contact and admonish individual subscribers it suspects of copyright infringement and
would prefer not to file suit against them.”247 The court, however, dismissed Verizon’s argument
on this point, stating that section 512(h)’s requirement of a sworn declaration that the
information to be obtained will only be used for the purpose of protecting copyrights is
sufficiently similar to the Rule 27(a) requirement as to render Verizon’s distinction between the
two provisions inconsequential.
While Verizon’s arguments raise legitimate theoretical Article III issues with respect to
the DMCA subpoena provision, this is likely to be an unsuccessful basis for future constitutional
challenges. As the Verizon II court pointed out, there are a significant number of similar
provisions in existence that have passed Article III muster.248 The strongest argument in support
of an Article III challenge is that section 512(h) is unique in allowing “a broad category of
private actors to obtain sensitive information from third parties, outside the context of
litigation.”249 Such private use of the courts nearly always occurs in the context of actual or
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pending litigation and under the supervision of a judge.250 An argument emphasizing this point
might be somewhat more successful than the approach taken by Verizon.
Another obstacle to the successful challenge of the DMCA subpoena provision on Article
III grounds is the fact that there is essentially only one other solution to this problem, which is
not entirely practical. That solution, which Verizon raised as a possible alternative in the first
case, would be to require copyright owners to bring “John Doe” actions before they could
subpoena alleged infringers’ subscriber information.251 This approach would require copyright
owners to file anonymous lawsuits before they would be able to discover alleged infringers’
identities.252 The court rejected this possible approach to the Article III problem on the grounds
that there was no support for it either in the text or the legislative history of the DMCA.253 The
court held that requiring such a procedure would defeat the major purpose of the statute, which is
the expeditious protection of copyrights.254 In addition, the court found that such a procedure
would be unduly burdensome on copyright owners and would not necessarily be any more
protective of the rights of alleged infringers.255
Although the DC Circuit never reached this constitutional issue on appeal, its decision to
disallow section 512(h) subpoenas in situations where the service provider is merely a passive
conduit for the transmission of infringing materials has effectively forced copyright holders to
begin bringing John Doe suits. Since the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in December
250
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Verizon I, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
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Id. at 40.
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Id. (holding that such a procedure would result in delays that would be at odds with Congress’s design for the
DMCA).
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Id. at 40-41.
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2003, the RIAA has ceased issuing section 512(h) subpoenas.256

Determined to continue

enforcing their rights under the law, copyright holders have resorted to bringing suits against
anonymous infringers and using traditional subpoenas to discover offenders’ identities within the
context of litigation.257
Due to the extremely rapid nature in which copyrighted songs are illegally disseminated
on P2P networks, John Doe suits are not an appropriate remedy for copyright holders. Forcing a
copyright holder to engage in costly and time-consuming litigation while the defendants continue
to anonymously share infringing materials with millions of other individuals is distinctly unfair
and contrary to Congressional intent. As the Verizon I court pointed out, Congress intended for
copyright holders to have an efficient and expeditious tool for uncovering and halting
infringement, which John Doe suits are not.258 As will be discussed shortly, a subpoena process
with built-in statutory protections would afford copyright owners with a remedy much more
suited to the problem posed by P2P networks while providing adequate protection for the rights
of alleged infringers. Ironically, offenders currently facing John Doe lawsuits would likely
prefer the section 512(h) subpoena process, which typically resulted in minimal settlements with
copyright holders, to full-blown lawsuits, which will no doubt result in much stiffer penalties.
It remains to be seen how other jurisdictions will rule on whether DMCA subpoenas
violate Article III. Although the issue is moot with respect to subpoenas issued in the District of
Columbia for the identities of P2P file sharers, it remains an open question in the remaining
eleven circuits where DMCA subpoenas issued based on infringement falling under section
256

RIAA Subpoenas Halted, Electronic Frontier Foundation (Dec. 1, 2003), at
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512(a) are still valid. Even if the other jurisdictions follow the lead of the DC Circuit in
disallowing section 512(h) subpoenas in situations where the service provider is merely a passive
conduit for the transmission of infringing materials, subpoenas issued in cases governed by
subsections (b) through (d) may still violate Article III. However, because there is analogous
precedent for subsection 512(h) and because there are no truly viable alternatives, Article III
challenges to the DMCA subpoena provision will likely continue to be unsuccessful.259
2.

Violations of the First Amendment Right to Free Speech and the Fifth
Amendment Guarantee of Federal Due Process?

Verizon, backed by a veritable throng of amici curiae supporters, also challenged the
DMCA subpoena provision on First and Fifth Amendment grounds in the second Verizon
case.260 Verizon contended that the statute provides insufficient procedural protection against
the subpoena provision’s intrusion on the right to free anonymous speech.261 Verizon argued
that, as interpreted by the RIAA and the Verizon I court, the subpoena provision is “vastly overly
broad” and should be held invalid.262
Discussing a line of recent decisions, Verizon noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has
“repeatedly recognized that individuals have a right to speak, listen, and associate anonymously”
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affording them the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Id.
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in numerous situations.263 Such free and anonymous expression extends to the context of the
Internet.264

Verizon acknowledged that “there is no First Amendment right to engage in

copyright infringement.”265 However, Verizon argued, the subpoena provision has the power to
strip away a user’s right to anonymity in other contexts.266 In addition, section 512(h) does not
include any “built-in safeguards” against the curtailment of free, anonymous speech in these
other contexts.267 Essentially, Verizon argued that although there is no right to free, anonymous
speech in the infringement of copyrights, there is a right to free, anonymous speech in other
legitimate online activities, and, in uncovering the identity of a user to establish infringement, the
DMCA subpoena provision deprives an alleged infringer of the right to speak anonymously in
any context. Without sufficient statutory safeguards to protect against the improper or mistaken
revelation of a subscriber’s identity, the subpoena provision is unconstitutionally broad. In
depriving an individual of such a fundamental right, the subpoena provision merely requires “an
ex parte ‘good faith’ allegation by anyone willing to allege he or she is a copyright owner, or
authorized to act on behalf of a copyright owner, and that copyright infringement might be
occurring.”268 Such measures are not enough to protect the right of free, anonymous speech,
Verizon argued.

Verizon noted that the lack of an adversarial process was the primary
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deficiency in the DMCA subpoena provision.269 This deficiency “will inevitably lead to both
honest mistakes and deliberate abuse—thereby stripping Internet users of anonymity even where
the underlying speech and association is fully protected.”270 In support of its argument, Verizon
cited an instance of mistake that had already occurred, which will be discussed later in this
Article in conjunction with an assortment of other mistakes and abuses that have occurred
recently under the authority of section 512(h).271
Not surprisingly, considering its holding in Verizon I, the Verizon II court rejected these
First and Fifth Amendment arguments and upheld the constitutionality of the DMCA subpoena
provision.272 As a preliminary matter, the court acknowledged that Verizon had standing to
assert these constitutional challenges on behalf of its subscribers.273

The court also

acknowledged that the Supreme Court has recognized a right of anonymity within the First
Amendment and that the protections of that right extend to expression on the Internet.274 In
addition, the court noted that there are some limitations on subpoena power “when its invocation
affects First Amendment rights involving anonymity.”275

The court found it significant,

however, that the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings that the First Amendment protects anonymity
have been rendered in the context of cases involving “core” First Amendment expression, such
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as religious or political speech.276 The court found that the DMCA subpoena power “does not
directly impact core political speech, and thus may not warrant the type of ‘exacting scrutiny’
reserved for that context.”277

The court concluded that although some First Amendment

protection should be afforded to anonymous expression on the Internet, the degree of that
protection “is minimal where alleged copyright infringement is the expression at issue.”278
In addition, the court found that section 512(h) affords alleged infringers sufficient
procedural safeguards to protect their First Amendment rights.279 The court pointed to the fact
that to obtain a section 512(h) subpoena, one must provide: (1) a statement that the use of
copyrighted material is not authorized by the owner and that the information in the notification is
accurate,280 (2) a sworn declaration to the effect that the purpose for which the subpoena is
sought is to obtain the identity of an alleged infringer and that such information will only be used
for the purpose of protecting copyrights,281 and (3) a statement, made under penalty of perjury,
that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of the infringed
copyright.282 Also, § 512(f) further discourages the abuse of subpoenas by providing for a cause
of action against anyone who “knowingly materially misrepresents” that activity is infringing.283
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Holding that these procedural safeguards sufficiently protect alleged infringers against baseless
or abusive subpoenas, the court concluded that “it is unlikely that section 512(h) will require
disclosure, to any significant degree, of the identity of individuals engaged in protected
anonymous speech, as opposed to those engaged in unprotected copyright infringement.”284
Finally, despite acknowledging that section 512(h) will impact some protected expression
and that the provision could be used to mistakenly pursue and obtain the identity of an innocent
user, Judge Bates concluded that section 512(h) is not so “substantially” overbroad that it may be
invalidated on its face.285 He found it significant that Verizon never introduced evidence of
abuse or mistake in the use of the DMCA subpoena provision during the five years since its
enactment.
Unfortunately, Judge Bates’s opinion in Verizon II contains several major holes and he
ignored important practical considerations regarding the DMCA’s operation. First, “all these
protections” cited by Judge Bates are not necessarily sufficient to protect the First Amendment
rights of alleged infringers. He listed three requirements for obtaining a subpoena pursuant to
the DMCA; however, each of these three requirements depends solely on the conscience of the
party attempting to obtain the subpoena. Two of them merely demand statements made in good
faith. Although the third requirement demands a statement made under penalty of perjury, the
slim chance that a U.S. Attorney will choose to prosecute such an offense is likely to have very
little deterrent effect.286 There is no step in the subpoena provision that allows for independent
verification of the statements made by the party seeking the subpoena before it is issued.
284
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Additionally, each of these safeguards listed by Judge Bates only protects against the
abuse of the DMCA subpoena power. They do nothing to prevent the release of identification
information in response to a subpoena issued based on a mistake made in good faith. Section
512 supplies a procedure for challenging mistaken takedown notices;287 such a procedure is even
more crucial in the subpoena context because identification information cannot be unlearned or
returned once it is received. An appropriate challenging mechanism would not involve anything
as burdensome as a full evidentiary hearing, but would only require that some minimal
independent assessment of the validity of the subpoena request be made, possibly by the service
provider or the clerk of the issuing court.
A second flaw in Judge Bates’s opinion lies in his disregard for the substantial potential
for overbreadth posed by the DMCA subpoena provision. Not finding any evidence of abuse or
mistakes in the subpoena provision’s short history, he essentially concluded that such a risk is
minimal.288 There have occurred already, however, instances of mistakenly issued subpoenas
and subpoena responses.289 For example, MIT finally released to the RIAA the name and
information of a student with whom it associated the IP address listed on the subpoena issued by
the RIAA. “Despite having been out of the country at the time of the alleged infringement and
declaring that he did not even own a computer, the student was unable to prevent release of his
name and identifying information.”290 In another case, “seven record labels mistakenly sued a
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Recording Industry Withdraws Suit, Boston Globe, Sept. 24, 2003), at
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65-year-old Massachusetts woman for copyright infringement…based only on KaAaA
screenshots and Comcast’s disclosure of her name and address in response to a subpoena.”291
The woman, however, only used a Macintosh computer, which cannot support the KaZaA
program.292

Clearly, contrary to Judge Bates’s opinion, mistakes have occurred and will

continue to occur as long as the subpoena provision operates as it currently stands, thus, resulting
in the improper deprivation of First Amendment rights.
Judge Bates’s reasoning also ignores the fact that the subpoena provision has experienced
extremely limited use until very recently.

Copyright owners have primarily utilized the

takedown notification process throughout most of the DMCA’s short life.293 These takedown
notifications have achieved notoriety for their frequent mistakes and often frivolous and
harassing nature. A glance at the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s website confirms that this
reputation is indeed deserved.294

It contains multiple documented instances of takedown

notifications issued mistakenly or for purposes of harassment.295 The takedown provisions
contain even more safeguards than the subpoena provision, yet it is still vulnerable to frequent
mistakes and misuse. Evidently, the safeguards that Judge Bates listed in his opinion are not
sufficient to protect the subpoena provision from infringing on users’ First Amendment rights in
an overbroad manner. Section 512 is in dire need of additional procedural safeguards that would
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protect users from erroneous identification without unduly burdening copyright owners in their
quest to pursue and put an end to infringement.
C.

Practical Policy Issues: The Subpoena Provision’s Negative Potential
In addition to these constitutional and statutory issues that have been propounded with

respect to the DMCA subpoena provision, various practical concerns have been raised regarding
its application.

Privacy advocates are quick to note the number of erroneous takedown

notifications and subpoenas that have been issued under the DMCA.296 Descriptions of worstcase scenarios that could arise as a result of abuse of the subpoena provision abound. However,
even a well-functioning subpoena process would inherently possess some potential for mistakes
and abuses. A well-functioning subpoena process could also impose significant burdens, both
legally and administratively, on all the parties involved, especially in the event that a large
number of subpoenas are issued. Several questions arise in connection with the management of
these negative consequences, but only two will be discussed in this Article. First, who should
bear the burden of responding to masses of subpoenas? Also, who should bear the burden of
discovering and compensating for the mistakes and abuses that will inevitably occur?
1.

Undue Response Burden

In answer to the first question, it may be more appropriate and efficient to shift at least
some of the burden of responding to the potential flood of DMCA subpoenas back to the
copyright owners. In the current battle against copyright infringement, there are many copyright
owners from a broad range of backgrounds pursuing a host of online copyright infringers.297 The
296
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incredibly large number of parties involved could result in a landslide of subpoenas that would
overrun smaller ISPs.298 It takes a service provider employee approximately 20 minutes to
research and respond to a subpoena request.299

Multiplying this time expenditure by the

thousands of potential subpoenas—not simply from the music recording industry, but also from
many other types of copyright owners—results in significant potential expense for service
providers.

Not only would the administrative burden of responding to each subpoena be

overwhelming, but the potential legal burden stemming from fighting a subpoena or defending
an action for improper release of identification information could also be enormous. Smaller
service providers generally have minimal administrative staffing and no legal department. The
burden that would be caused by a flood of subpoenas would crush many of these smaller ISPs
out of existence.
The problem with the current process is that there are no limiting factors that would
provide some control over the number of subpoenas that are issued. First, the identification of
infringers and the request for subpoenas is an almost completely automated process for copyright
owners, which means that they bear little burden or cost at the front end that would limit the
number of subpoenas requested.300 Second, there are no requirements on what a copyright owner

industries, software distributors and a host of independent writers and artists have utilized the DMCA, whether
wrong or right, to protect their copyrights.
298

District of Columbia Court Lacks Authority to Issue DMCA Subpoenas to Boston Schools, 66 ELECTRONIC COM.
& L. REP. No. 1634, at 459 (Aug. 15, 2003); Issues Arising out of RIAA v. Verizon, Electronic Privacy Information
Center (Dec. 19, 2003) (noting the general concern “that as copyright holders chase after hundreds or even
thousands of peer-to-peer users using automated copyright infringement monitors, such as Ranger Inc., it will result
in huge costs for the ISPs faced with processing the requests”), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/copyright/verizon/
(last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
299

Bob Liu, Copyrights: More Work, More Headaches, Internet.com (March 12, 2003) (noting that a network
administrator at a university with only 5,500 students requires 15 to 30 minutes to find the source of the copyright
infringement upon receiving a complaint), at http://isp-planet.com/perspectives/2003/bliu.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2004).
300

See Manjoo, supra note 37 (quoting Peter Swire, law professor at Ohio State University).

63

must do once he has obtained an alleged infringer’s identification information.301 Requiring a
copyright owner to pursue an action or to at least further investigate the matter would ensure that
the copyright owner only requests subpoenas in situations where infringement is at least
somewhat certain. Because there is no such requirement that any kind of legal or investigative
action be taken, there are no practical limitations at the tail end of the process either. Finally,
there is no provision for shifting the cost of improperly issued subpoenas back to copyright
owners.

Such a provision would decrease the number of mistakenly issued subpoenas by

providing copyright owners with incentive to request subpoenas only in situations where they are
fairly certain that infringement is indeed occurring.
Essentially, the current process unfairly distributes the entire burden of responding to
subpoenas to ISPs in a manner that is contrary to the legislature’s intent in enacting section 512.
While Congress intended to make the enforcement process as fast and efficient as possible for
copyright owners,302 this goal is not sacrificed by forcing copyright owners to bear some of the
administrative costs that responding to subpoenas imposes. Especially in the event of mistakenly
issued subpoenas, over which service providers have no control, such a burden shifting scheme
would seem appropriate and much more efficient. It must be remembered that the other primary
goal of section 512 is to clarify and limit the liability of service providers for their subscribers’
infringement.303 From a monetary perspective, the burden of responding to a flood of subpoena
requests could serve as much of a penalty as would a finding of liability for infringement, thus
defeating one of the major goals of the DMCA. Congress made it clear that section 512 was
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intended to foster cooperation between service providers and copyright owners in the fight
against infringement.304 Such legislative intent should not be arbitrarily limited to exclude
financial cooperation.
2.

Undue Burden of Identifying and Correcting Erroneous Subpoenas

Similarly, the entire burden of discovering abusive and erroneous DMCA subpoenas also
falls squarely on the shoulder of ISPs and their subscribers. The RIAA claims that it individually
checks each subpoena request before it is sent to the clerk of the court, but obviously mistakes
slip past their inspection process.305 The burden of catching these missed mistakes subsequently
falls on the service providers. If the service provider chooses not to respond to an erroneously
issued subpoena, it must move to quash it in court and bears the cost for doing so. If the service
provider simply responds to the erroneous subpoena, as the DMCA requires, the service provider
may open itself up to potential liability.306 In either event, the service provider bears the burden
of not only discovering the copyright owner’s mistake, but also correcting it. This inequitable
result could be remedied with the incorporation of a provision in section 512 that requires
copyright owners to compensate service providers for any costs associated with challenging
erroneously issued subpoenas.
By no means does this Article purport to discuss every issue that has been raised with
respect to the DMCA subpoena provision, but these represent most of the more compelling
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challenges. Next, Part V proposes various changes that could be introduced to section 512,
which would alleviate many of these problems.

V.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE DMCA SUBPOENA PROVISION

The fact that so many challenges have been levied against the DMCA subpoena provision
and so many practical issues have been raised with respect to its application makes it
exceedingly clear that the subpoena provision, in its current state, is significantly flawed. These
flaws were not a major concern until recently, when they became magnified as a result of
copyright owners’ sharply increased utilization of the provision. Rather than simply discarding
the subpoena provision, however, a better approach would be to augment it with additional
procedural privacy protections.
A.

Subscriber Notice
The issuance of formal notification to subscribers before their identity is revealed would

provide them with warning and would allow them to contest wrongfully issued subpoenas. Such
notice would come from the service provider and would likely arrive in the form of an e-mail to
streamline the process as much as possible. Several state statutes require that service providers
afford notice to an anonymous subscriber at least a certain period of time before they may release
the subscriber’s identity to the subpoenaing party.307 A notice requirement would preserve the
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due process rights of Internet users and would also act as a deterrence to abusive subpoena
requests.308 Such notice would also increase the public’s awareness of the legal actions that
copyright owners are bringing against infringers, which would result in a further deterrent
effect.309 Finally, the provision of notice to subscribers would not disrupt the investigation or
enforcement process because the copyright owners would already have sufficient evidence of the
infringement by the time the user is informed of the subpoena.310
While the requirement of such notice would cost copyright holders precious time, the
subpoena could be served in conjunction with a takedown notification to the service provider or
the subscriber, depending on where the infringing materials are located.311 Such a measure
would prevent any infringing material from being made available to other users while the
enforcement is pending. In the case of infringing files located directly on the alleged infringer’s
computer, the suspect would be warned to disable online access to them. If the suspect refused
to cooperate, his or her service could be terminated until the issue is resolved.
B.

Restrictions on Retention and Use of Subpoenaed Information
To some extent, section 512 purports to restrict the manner in which subscriber identity

information can be used.312 Such restrictions, however, could be more explicitly clarified, and a
specific limit could be placed on the time period for which identity information could be
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retained.313 Such a time limit would most appropriately be based on whether or not legal action
is taken against the alleged infringer. For example, such a scheme could require that the
information be erased within a period of 6 months after it is obtained if no suit is filed within that
time. Otherwise, the information would have to be erased within a period of 6 months after the
settlement or conclusion of a lawsuit and any resulting appeal.
These restrictions on content and duration would not hinder copyright owners using the
subpoena process for legitimate enforcement purposes, but would go a long way to prevent
identity information from being misused. Identity and contact information, especially in mass
quantities, is extremely valuable today for advertising purposes. It is not inconceivable that a
less than scrupulous copyright holder might sell a list of such information to an advertising
agency or online business. Additionally, copyright holders could organize subpoenaed identity
information to create infringer blacklists.314 Those winding up on such a blacklist could find
their names posted online or find themselves restricted from legitimately purchasing digital
music recordings online. Specific restrictions on how copyright holders may use subpoenaed
identity information and substantial penalties for their violation would ensure that such
information is only used for the enforcement of copyrights and would help to alleviate legitimate
public concern.
C.

Private Right of Action for Abuse of Subpoena Process
Congress attempted to provide for penalties for abuse relating to section 512,315 but

further penalties are necessary to cover the broader range of situations that may currently arise in
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the context of copyright enforcement. In addition to providing a right of action against those
materially misrepresenting infringement, such liability should also extend to service providers
who do not provide notice to their subscribers and to copyright owners who misuse identification
information. At least one state, California, has already begun considering similar legislation.316
An extension of the penalties already provided for in section 512 would not burden parties using
the subpoena authority for legitimate copyright enforcement, but would provide Internet users
with recourse against abuses of the system.
Holding a service provider liable for failure to give notice to a subscriber that his or her
identity has been subpoenaed places the burden of ensuring due process for the subscriber on the
service provider. While this may seem somewhat harsh since the service provider is technically
not even involved in the dispute, there is no other way to guarantee that the subscriber receives
notice of the pending subpoena. The service provider is the only link between the copyright
holder and the alleged infringer. As a result, there must be consequences for the failure to carry
out the simple yet important task of conveying notice of a subpoena to the allegedly infringing
subscriber.
D.

Cost Reimbursement
Currently, the burden of responding to DMCA subpoenas falls entirely on ISPs. Shifting

at least a portion of this burden back to copyright owners would not be inconsistent with the
legislative intent behind section 512.317 Requiring copyright owners to reimburse at least some
of the costs associated with responding to subpoenas is also consistent with Rule 45 of the
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the subpoena provisions of several other federal statutes.318
As discussed above, these costs have the potential to be significant, especially for smaller service
providers. Section 512 currently does not provide any incentive, either negative or positive, to
copyright holders to minimize these costs by ensuring the accuracy and appropriateness of their
subpoena requests.
One reason for not statutorily shifting a portion of the subpoena response costs back to
the copyright holders would be that service providers indirectly benefit, in the form of monthly
service fees, from their subscribers’ infringement. This logic falls apart to some extent, however,
considering that most subscribers to Internet service would continue to use the Internet for other
purposes regardless of their ability to download copyrighted material. Service providers do not
receive any more or less benefit based on the type of online activity in which their subscribers
engage.
On the other hand, the creation of some type of reimbursement scheme would likely
reduce the number of frivolous, abusive, and erroneous subpoenas, thus rendering the entire
process more efficient. If copyright holders knew that they would be subject to statutory fees or
penalties for serving erroneous subpoenas or to liability for serving abusive or frivolous
subpoenas, the issuance of an improper subpoena would likely be a much rarer occurrence.
Statutorily shifting the cost of subpoenas in such cases would balance the burden of ensuring the
accuracy of all subpoenas more evenly between service providers and copyright holders.
E.

Reporting Requirement
One of the problems with section 512(h), which has resulted in significant public outcry

against the DMCA, is that the public has little idea how often and for what purposes the
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subpoena provision is being used.319 An amendment to section 512(h) requiring an annual report
to Congress on the number of subpoenas requested and granted and for what types of
copyrighted material would provide the legislature with information that could be used to
monitor for abuses and further streamline the subpoena process.320 Such a requirement would
also greatly allay the public’s fear because much of that fear is of the unknown, rather than the
subpoena process itself.
F.

Putting it all Together
In a rather disjunctive fashion, this Article recommends a number of possible

improvements to the DMCA subpoena provision. In concluding this discussion, it would likely
be helpful to the reader to visualize how each of these improvements would work together to
strengthen protection for the interests of both copyright holders and Internet users.

The

following hypothetical should assist the reader in this exercise.
Take the case of Bart and James, best friends and next door neighbors. Bart often uses
his family’s computer to illegally download copyrighted music files from a P2P program called
SongsRus. Because James’s parents have warned him not to download copyrighted music on
their computer, he gets his daily dose of illegal audio entertainment at Bart’s house. James,
being an aspiring artist, has also drawn renderings of scenes from two recent motion pictures,
which he saved on his computer in files titled after the movies. Not surprisingly, the local ISP,
SpeedyCom, is subsequently served with subpoenas for the identities of both Bart and James by
A1 Records and Big Hitz Entertainment, respectively.
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Assuming that these two subpoenas were not issued from a court in the DC circuit, under
the current law, SpeedyCom would likely respond immediately to the subpoena pursuant to
section 512(h), releasing both Bart’s and James’s identities (or their parents’).

Unless

SpeedyCom subsequently notified the families of the subpoenas and the release of their
identities, neither family would even be aware of any trouble until contacted by the copyright
holders or served with citation. Of course, the mistake made in James’s case would be quickly
discovered, but still too late to undo the release of his family’s identity.
The proposals outlined in this Article, however, would require SpeedyCom to notify both
Bart’s and James’s families before releasing their subscriber information. If SpeedyCom did not
comply with this requirement, it would be liable to both families for damages and/or a statutory
penalty.321 Upon notification, each family would have the opportunity to present evidence to
SpeedyCom as to why the subpoenas should not be answered. In James’s case, SpeedyCom
would simply pass this evidence onto Big Hitz Entertainment, and the mistake would be easily
resolved. Big Hitz could be required to pay a statutory fee to SpeedyCom for the cost of
handling the mistaken subpoena issuance.

If, for some reason, Big Hitz still insisted that

SpeedyCom respond to the subpoena, SpeedyCom could file a motion to quash in the court from
which the subpoena was issued. Upon the court’s granting of this motion, Big Hitz would be
forced to reimburse SpeedyCom for the additional expense of protecting its subscriber.
In Bart’s case, it is unlikely that evidence could be supplied to SpeedyCom as to why A1
Record’s subpoena should not be answered. If Bart’s family never responded with any such
evidence or, upon evaluation of the evidence submitted, SpeedyCom determined that copyright
infringement had indeed occurred, it would release the appropriate identifying information to A1
321
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fact guilty of copyright violation.
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Records and notify Bart’s family accordingly. If SpeedyCom found some evidence suggesting
that Bart had not engaged in copyright violation, it could again bring a motion to quash in the
court from which the subpoena was issued. Upon the court’s denial of this motion, SpeedyCom
would be forced to reimburse A1 Records for the expense of enforcing the subpoena.
Suppose that Bart’s family settles the dispute with A1 Records, but months later, A1
Records discovers that it can recoup some of the profits it has lost over the years to copyright
infringement by selling all the identity information it has collected via DMCA subpoenas to an
advertising or data collection agency. A1 Records feels that the annoying spam and sales calls
that past infringers would receive after the sale of their information would serve them right. As
it currently stands, section 512 does not provide recourse for Bart’s family in this situation or
penalties to be assessed against A1 Records for abuse of the subpoena process. If the proposals
in this Article were implemented, Bart’s family would have a private right of action against A1
Records. Such an action would be for the recovery of a statutory penalty, which would vary
depending on the severity of the abuse.
This hypothetical situation highlights the major procedural shortcomings in the DMCA
subpoena process and outlines a more equitable cost-balancing scheme, which would shift some
of the burden of dealing with these subpoenas back to the copyright holders. This hypothetical
also demonstrates the significant impact that implementing these relatively simple changes in the
law would have.

VI.

CONCLUSION

As the old saying goes, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” Well, the DMCA subpoena
provision is clearly “broke” and clearly requires fixing. Section 512(h) provides a very useful
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and very necessary tool for copyright owners to combat online copyright infringement. Without
such a provision, copyright owners would have no recourse against the actual perpetrators of
infringement. Without there being any way for copyright owners to identify potential infringers,
Internet users could continue engaging in copyright violation with impunity, hidden behind an
impenetrable veil of anonymity. As it currently exists, however, section 512(h) threatens to tear
down the entire curtain, exposing the identities of many innocent subscribers and depriving them
of their fundamental Constitutional rights. This is an unacceptable result, even in the context of
copyright enforcement. Section 512 could easily be amended to include the various procedural
safeguards discussed above, which would protect the rights of individual users and alleviate the
potential burden on ISPs, while continuing to afford copyright owners with an effective and
expeditious mechanism for pursuing infringers.
Additionally, although enacted fewer than six years ago, section 512 is already in need of
updating to bring it in line with current technology. In restructuring or redrafting the DMCA,
Congress should give serious thought to simplifying section 512. In its current state, it is unduly
specific and complicated, and thus does not afford copyright holders protection from the most
serious form of infringement presently taking place. Legislation cannot anticipate tomorrow’s
technology today, but in simplifying section 512, Congress could make it much more likely that
future forms of copyright infringement are covered under the next version of the DMCA.
As it currently stands, section 512 does not adequately protect the interests of copyright
holders or Internet users. Rather than forcing the courts to legislate from their benches or
allowing conflicting case law to sprout up across the country, Congress must act quickly to
resolve the issues that have been raised with respect to the DMCA subpoena provision before too
much damage is done. Unfortunately, while several legislators have raised outspoken challenges
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to the provision, Congress appears deadlocked on how best to resolve these complicated issues.
Thus, it may be some time before section 512 sees any substantive changes. Hopefully, the
recent Verizon opinion will provide the impetus necessary to spur Congress to a speedier
resolution. In the meantime, copyright infringement may decline, but so will the protection of
copyrights and Internet users’ fundamental constitutional rights.
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